

CHAPTER 5

THE PERSISTENCE OF CREDIBILITY: INTERESTS, THREATS AND PLANNING FOR THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER

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In Ibsen's *Hedda Gabler*, when one protagonist comments "But, good heavens, we know nothing of the future," another replies: "No, but there is a thing or two to be said about it all the same." This is equally true today, even in a period of transition marked not only by change, but by the ubiquity and rapidity of change. The reason is that continuity invariably accompanies change, in many cases providing historical guidelines which, if used carefully, can provide a basis for saying "a thing or two" about the future. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that such historical threads do indeed provide a basis for analysis of one of the most important issues facing the United States in the post-Cold War era: the use of military power in national security policy. Key to that analysis is the continuity implicit in the concept of national credibility, defined as a combination of a nation's capability to influence other international actors and the perceived willingness to use that capability. It is a concept that links the past, present and future in the complex interaction of national interests and the threats to those interests.

THE COLD WAR LEGACY OF INTERESTS AND CREDIBILITY.

"A small knowledge of human nature will convince us," George Washington once stated, "that with far the greatest part of mankind, interest is the governing principle."¹ At the U.S. Army War College, national interests are presented as desired conditions—the enduring end states by which nations rationally prioritize their efforts. The core interests are divided into four categories: physical security, economic prosperity, promotion of values, and world order.² They are further refined in terms of their intensity: vital, important and peripheral.

Physical security refers to the protection against attack on the territory and people of a nation state in order to ensure survival with fundamental values and political systems intact. This category dominated U.S. focus for most of the Cold War, with containment of the Soviet Union on the Eurasian landmass as the justification for the buildup of forces and institutions that came to make up the national security state. In terms of prosperity during that same period, the United States was economically supreme in the world as demonstrated in such institutions as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and in the global dominance of the dollar for much of that time. For Americans, foreign policy must also reflect the values for which they believe their country stands. The promotion of these values in the Cold War was captured in the crusade of anti-Communism, which in turn was enhanced by its linkage to the geostrategic goal of containment. "I believe," President Truman declared in the

March 1947 doctrine named for him, "that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation...to work out their own destinies in their own way."³

It was in pursuit of the last category of world order that U.S. leaders discovered how the concept of credibility during the Cold War could blur the distinction between intensity of national interests. From a rational viewpoint, vital interests during that long twilight conflict should have been focused exclusively on the bipolar, superpower core as opposed to the global "periphery" of that core. But, as John Lewis Gaddis pointed out, the distant sound of dominoes falling could be just as loud as sabres rattling next door.⁴ This type of connectivity was closely tied to the psychological aspects of credibility with potential aggressors—summed up in Pericles' classic argument against giving in to foreign demands: "If you give in, you will immediately be confronted with some greater demand, since they will think that you only gave way on this point through fear."⁵ Thus, there was the 1950 invasion of South Korea, the survival of which had been defined as outside vital U.S. interests but which, because of the nature of the North Korean attack, quickly joined that degree of intensity. "If we let Korea down," Truman briefed Congress after the attack,

the Soviets will keep right on going and swallow up one piece of Asia after another If we were to let Asia go, the Near East would collapse [and there is] no telling what would happen in Europe.⁶

In addition, as George Kennan discovered at the beginning of the Cold War, the problems with credibility were not just confined to actual or potential enemies. There were also the psychological problems of open pluralistic societies in trying to differentiate between vital and other interests. In this context, defeats on the periphery could have demoralizing effects on the public and elites in areas where core or intrinsic interests were involved. Moreover, there was also the problem of cumulative effects. In 1947, for example, Kennan was concerned that Soviet victories might cause a bandwagon effect in West Europe, not because of any ideological affinity, but from purely pragmatic motives to join the movement of the future. And in the fall of 1961, this phenomenon was evident in President Kennedy's justification for his increasing commitment to South Vietnam. "There are limits to the number of defeats I can defend in one twelve-month period," he explained. "I've had the Bay of Pigs and pulling out of Laos, and I can't accept a third."⁷

By that time, the domino principle was fully enshrined in the indiscriminate perimeter approach to containment with its assumption of undifferentiated interests and unlimited means. The expectations of domino dynamics in this approach caused interests to become a function of the threat and as a consequence credibility to become an interest in itself. In such circumstances, prioritization was impossible. "I don't know where the non-essential areas are," President Kennedy acknowledged in an off-the-record press briefing.⁸ Equally important, the approach left the United States in a strategically reactive mode, since the potential adversary could create a crisis at a time and place of its choosing which the U.S., focused on universal credibility, could ignore only at its perceived peril. "Unlike those sociable games it takes two to play," Thomas Schelling once noted, "with chicken it takes two *not* to

play. If you are publicly invited to play chicken and say you would rather not, you have just played.”⁹

REACTION.

The most important concerns with domino dynamics and the use of military force found expression in a 1984 speech by the Secretary of Defense outlining six criteria for commitment of U.S. troops abroad that were clearly focused on the problem of credibility. Under this so-called “Weinberger Doctrine,” force would be used as a last resort and with the clear intention of winning—but only when the vital interests of the United States and its allies were threatened. There must also be clearly defined political and military objectives combined with the knowledge of how the U.S. forces could accomplish those objectives. “War may be different today than in Clausewitz’s time, but the need for a well-defined objective and a consistent strategy is still essential.” Moreover, the relationship between political and military objectives and the size and composition of the forces committed must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary with, as a constant “beacon light,” the basic question: “Is this conflict in our national interest?” Finally, there was the requirement for the reasonable assurance of support by the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.

We cannot fight a battle . . . at home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win, but just to be there.¹⁰

But the issue of credibility would not prove so simple. A few months later, Secretary of State Shultz defined the dilemma in a reply to the Weinberger Doctrine that was muted at the time by the Cold War. In a complex world, Shultz pointed out, there were also “gray-area challenges” in regional and local conflicts that were often far removed from major war but nonetheless, absent responses by the United States, would have important adverse cumulative effects on American credibility. We live as is commonly said, on a shrinking planet and in a world of increasing interdependence. We have an important stake in the health of the world economy and in the overall condition of global security; the freedom and safety of our fellow human beings will always impinge upon our moral consciousness. Not all these challenges threaten vital interests, but at the same time an accumulation of successful challenges can add up to a major adverse change in the geo-political balance. . . . American military power should be resorted to only if the stakes justify it, if other means are not available, and then only in a manner appropriate to the objective. But we cannot opt out of every contest. If we do, the world’s future will be determined by others—most likely by those who are the most brutal, the most unscrupulous and the most hostile to our deeply held principles.¹¹ This theme was renewed after the end of the Cold War. As he left office, President Bush pointed out in a major speech that the use of military power must be considered without “rigid criteria” on a case-by-case basis. “The relative importance of an interest is not a guide,” he concluded. “Military force . . . might be the best way to protect an interest that qualified as important, but less than vital.”¹²

President Bush was no doubt influenced by the outcome of Desert Storm, which only fed the post-Cold War euphoria concerning the management of power, and led to impossibly high

expectations in the realm of lesser multilateral operations on the periphery ranging from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. The result early in the Clinton Administration was a policy that came to be called "assertive multilateralism," the major rationale of which was to maintain U.S. global involvement at a much-reduced cost. The principal vehicle was to be a reinvigorated United Nations that not only would provide legitimacy to interventions on the periphery, but would mount such operations with its own resources. All this, it was expected, would constrain unwanted unilateralism by other nations while easing the burden for the U.S.¹³

The reality was somewhat different. To begin with, there was the realization that traditional UN peacekeepers had never been able to create the conditions for their own success and that to establish institutional capabilities in the UN for such endeavors would be an enormous undertaking. At the same time, U.S. forces were increasingly involved in Somalia where humanitarianism was evolving into peace enforcement and nation building. The loss of American soldiers in Mogadishu in October 1993 renewed an intense debate by the public and Congress. The outcome in May 1994 was Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, a set of preconditions for U.S. participation in Security Council votes on peace operations as well as for the actual involvement in such operations—all distinctly reminiscent, with its "stringent conditionality," of the Weinberger Doctrine. Most of the considerations in the PDD, one analyst observed, "taken individually, appear reasonable...under most circumstances. Taken collectively, however, against the backdrop of the experiences with the use of force in the post-Cold War world and the current priorities of the Administration and Congress, these factors appear so constraining as to be prohibitive of action."¹⁴

WARFIGHTING VS. MOOTW.

The question of selectivity is particularly important for a U.S. military stuck squarely on the horns of a dilemma between, on the one side, peace operations and other nontraditional missions—all collectively labeled Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)—and on the other, preparation for threats to vital national interests. For some critics, there is no dilemma. Many non- or less-traditional MOOTW missions, Carl Builder points out, are actually more traditional than those normally associated with military forces and likely to become even more common in the future. Army engineers, for example, worked on roads throughout much of America's history and built the Panama Canal. And the military has remained the ultimate safety net whether it involved efforts at the 1871 Chicago fire or those concerned with earthquake, flood and other humanitarian relief in the 1990s; or whether it involved the suppression of riots and revolt ranging from Shay's 1786 Rebellion to the 1992 Los Angeles riots. For Builder, however, the case for nontraditional roles ultimately rests on a view of the future in which states lose their legal monopoly of armed forces and the current distinctions between war and crime break down.¹⁵ At that time, contends Robert Kaplan, the leading exponent of this apocalyptic view, "the classificatory grid of nation-states is going to be replaced by a jagged-glass pattern of city states, shanty-states, nebulous and anarchic regionalisms. . . ." It will be a "bifurcated world" with part of the globe inhabited by the well-fed recipient of all that technology can offer, and the other, much larger part, peopled by Hobbes's First Man, living out his "poor, nasty, brutish, and short" life. In such a world,

Kaplan sees re-primitivized man in warrior societies operating in an environment marked by planetary overcrowding and unprecedented resource scarcity in which state supported, technologically-enhanced military will have no effect.

The intense savagery of the fighting in such diverse cultural settings as Liberia, Bosnia, the Caucasus, and Sri Lanka—to say nothing of what obtains in American inner cities—indicates something very troubling that those of us inside the stretch limo, concerned with issues like middle-class entitlements and the future of interactive cable television, lack the stomach to contemplate. It is this: a large number of people on this planet, to whom the comfort and stability of a middle-class life is utterly unknown, find war and a barracks existence a step up rather than a step down.¹⁶

In this environment, other critics contend, the U.S. military has hunkered down, protecting hierarchical structures, and like German officers a half-century before, attempting to reestablish a basis for military professionalism incorporated in the view that war remains the special province of the warrior who can thus rightly claim a distinctive status in society. The revolution in military affairs in such a milieu is nothing more than a reactionary attempt to ignore nuclear and unconventional warfare as well as other factors that shape warfare, while conveying, in A.J. Bacevich's description, a "techno-chic" image of military institutions "in the midst of continuous transformation, redesigning, restructuring and reorganizing in a hell-bent rush to embrace the future." In this light, scenarios of major regional contingencies are simply attempts to revive an unlikely model of limited war more suited to 18th century politics than an era of changing warfare. "If forces designed and equipped in compliance with the dictates of the future are ill-suited for dealing with civil wars, ethnic conflicts, failed states, and terror," Bacevich concludes, "then they are of limited utility in the world as it exists."¹⁷

All this, particularly that concerned with the more likely low intensity aspects of future conflict, is reminiscent of those arguments during the Cold War that caused Robert Komer to define the "likelihood fallacy" as posturing to deal primarily with the most likely contingencies on the conflict spectrum to the detriment of the less likely but most critical ones. The ultimate result is that by ignoring the most critical contingencies, they become in fact the most likely.¹⁸ Such considerations have direct credibility implications for trade-offs concerning forces designed to protect vital national interests in major regional contingencies. For example, the U.S. Army, primarily configured for these contingencies, has a shortage of mobile light divisions that could be used in urban, jungle or mountain operations. The temptation in such circumstances is to ignore Ambassador Komer's warning. "Given the increased importance of peacemaking, peacekeeping operations and the *likelihood* of other contingencies to which airborne and air assault forces would be best suited," one analyst concludes, "... it seems that the priority being given to heavy units—the very forces for which Air Forces can most nearly substitute on the margin—may be overdone."¹⁹

For other critics like Paul Bracken, the controversy itself is irrelevant, since the choices are irrelevant. On the one hand, there is warfighting against "B" competitors, "mid-level developing states with modernized conventional forces (much like Iraq in 1990), with the possibility of Model T nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) forces." On the other, there is what is essentially MOOTW against "C" competitors, "militarily ineffectual nations with complex or complicated security problems: ethnic civil war (Yugoslavia), insurgency (Peru),

terrorism (Egypt), civil disorder (Somalia), or infiltration (narcotic flows)." Bracken's advice is to avoid the messy "C" states and deal with the "terra incognita" of potential "A" nations, "peer competitors, or major regional competitors with which the United States may have to deal." In the future, "B" countries may graduate to this level by a combination of training, doctrine, and the availability worldwide of advanced military technologies, to include weapons of mass destruction. In any event, an emergent "A" state may not have a direct adverse effect on U.S. interests, but like Germany after 1870, might so upset a regional balance as to affect those interests.²⁰

THE SECURITY DILEMMA.

There is today, of course, a historically remarkable absence of great power competition. Nevertheless, international politics not only abhors a vacuum, but the diffusion of power as well. And although predictions of even more such diffusion are currently fashionable, situations involving either impending or actual power maldistribution always return. "There may not be a precisely predictable superpower force (state or coalition) in the U.S. future of today," Colin Gray reminds us, "but all of history says that such a force will reappear."²¹

It is comforting to think that with the communication-information revolution, it is improbable that an "A" level peer superthreat could grow and suddenly emerge. But even one of the sharpest critics of the current U.S. global role admits the possibility of "the appearance of a 'careful' challenger able to cloak its ambitions and ward off external balancing against it. . . ."²² Moreover, as described in chaos theory, there can be a rapid growth and emergence of nonlinear threats—that is, some change in fundamental conditions that may have later consequences radically disproportionate in their adverse effect. Trend analysis has great difficulty in dealing with such nonlinear possibilities. All in all, as Richard Betts has pointed out in terms that apply to any future peer threat for the United States, major discontinuities in international politics are seldom predicted. Who would not have been derided and dismissed in 1988 for predicting that within a mere 3 years Eastern Europe would be liberated, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union deposed, and the Union itself on the ash heap of history? Yet it is hard to believe that the probability of equally revolutionary negative developments, of economic crisis and ideological disillusionment with democracy, of scapegoating and instability leading to miscalculation, escalation, and war several years from now is lower than the probability of the current peace seemed several years ago.²³

The security dilemma in such an environment is not that U.S. defense precautions will cause other nations to perceive them as hostile and thus counterbalance; but rather that absent a standing military force sufficient to deal credibly with such surprises, democratic politics will respond with too little, too late to burgeoning security dangers. Historically in such a situation, as Britain's interwar "Ten Year Rule" illustrates, there is a tendency to wish away the gap between perceived risks and political action even as those risks grow. "It should be assumed for framing revised estimates," the "Rule" stipulated, "that the British Empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years, and that no Expeditionary Force is required to this purpose. . . ."²⁴ And although there were compelling international and domestic reasons for the "Rule" when it was adopted in 1919, the automatic annual renewal

through 1932 of the assumption that there would be no major war for ten years, left the British ripe for appeasement of the emerging peer threat in Nazi Germany for the remaining years of the interwar period.²⁵ In this, as W. H. Auden captured in 1939, Britain was not alone.

In the nightmare of the dark
All the dogs of Europe bark,
And the living nations wait,
Each sequestered in its hate;
Intellectual disgrace
Stares from every human face,
And the seas of pity lie
Locked and frozen in each eye.

CREDIBILITY AND CONNECTIVITY.

The exaggerated domino linkage in the Cold War blurred the distinction between the intensity of national interests. Nevertheless, connectivity can be an important tool in making such a differentiation. Vital interests from this perspective are those end states in the world that would require very few dominoes to fall in order to affect core national interests. Important interests would require more dominoes; and peripheral interests are those which no matter how many dominoes fall, will not affect core interests. All this would still not mitigate the danger of connectivity becoming a function of the threat. If a government begins with a threat assessment before a conceptualization of interest intensity, it may react to a threat with major commitments and resources devoid of any rational linkage to that intensity. In a similar manner, rational cost-benefit analysis should not be allowed to affect the intensity of interest. Although U.S. administrations sensibly make just such cost-benefit calculations, Robert Blackwill points out that these should be analytically independent from judgements about how important to the United States a particular national security interest is. We may choose to defend a peripheral U.S. interest because it is not costly to do so; the interest nevertheless is still peripheral. Or we may choose not to defend vigorously an important—hopefully not vital—U.S. national security interest because we decide it is too expensive in a variety of ways to do so; the interest nevertheless is still important, and we may well pay dearly for our unreadiness to engage.²⁶

Prioritization, then, is the ultimate rationale for the use of national interests—the *sine qua non* for any clarity and long-term consistency in a nation's security policy. To move interest after interest upward into the vital or important degrees of intensity is simply to avoid choice, an unrealistic policy given declining means and the myriad domestic problems facing the nation. This all presupposes, of course, fairly rational environments and processes. But, as an example, nations can miscalculate the relationships between near-term cost and long-term benefits. Thus, there was Neville Chamberlain's perception of the Munich crisis: "If we have to fight it must be on larger issues than that."²⁷ And, in addition to domestic considerations, there was more than a touch of the credibility argument in the Clinton administration's rationalization for the deployment of U.S. forces to Haiti—all somewhat reminiscent of arguments why Britain had to suppress the Irish rebellion in World War I

despite the adverse effect on the war effort: "If you tell your empire in India, Egypt and all over the world that you have not got the men, the money, the pluck, the inclination, and the backing to restore order in a country within twenty miles of your own shore, you may as well begin to abandon the attempt to make British rule prevail throughout the empire at all."²⁸

In theory, the credibility factor should be drastically mitigated in the post-Cold War world. It is, after all, a world in which high indivisibility in political and economic relations among the advanced states is matched, using any rational standard, by low indivisibility in terms of security issues and conflicts on the periphery. Consequently, as cascading dominoes on the periphery have become increasingly less plausible, attention has turned to humanitarian concerns. Even here, however, end states in a pure value-based sense have proven much harder to achieve without the geopolitical tandem of the Cold War. The result in the current transition period is that intervention on the periphery is often debated in terms of what degree of intensity should be allotted to humanitarian concerns as a national interest. For example, institutions like Amnesty International generally perceive one connective step between abuses of human rights anywhere in the world and vital U.S. interests, because American values are at stake. While it is easy to dismiss such universal escalation as undermining the rational concept of connectivity and the ability to distinguish interest intensity, there are, as even Edmund Burke could conclude, "obligations written in the heart."²⁹ Humanitarian abuses, for instance, connect more directly with the higher intensity of U.S. interests to the extent the violations become public knowledge, the more they affect large groups of humans over longer periods of time, and the more they disproportionately strike at the most helpless, particularly children.

All that notwithstanding, the road of solitary universalist promotion of values leads everywhere and thus nowhere. The basic fact remains that peace in the post-Cold War era is simply not indivisible, which means that occasional failures to preserve stability in regions of secondary geopolitical importance are tolerable. "There will be some safety in indifference," Josef Joffe concludes in this regard, "and not every crisis needs to be approached as if it were a wholly owned subsidiary of American diplomacy."³⁰ Promoting regional security because of humanitarian concerns will rarely work and only then if the ways for achieving that security are cost-effective and can be sustained economically and politically on a long-term basis. That acceptability, as Douglas MacDonald points out, is key.

If cost-effectiveness criteria are not observed in making moral choices, moral outrage will soon dissolve into disillusionment, creating pressure to cut and run, which might leave matters worse than if there had been no intervention. Fighting bloody, inconclusive wars for humanitarian purposes will serve only to undercut support for America's long-range role as a leading force for world order.³¹

CONCLUSION.

Ultimately, the indiscriminate use of the U.S. military for social welfare is self-defeating. Such use normally places troops in situations where there are no demonstrable vital, much less important national interests. The fact is that conflict on the periphery just as it is at the core is controlled by its political objective, and that as Carl von Clausewitz long ago observed,

"the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in *magnitude* and also in *duration*."³² And as acknowledged by U.S. policy in the Balkans, in the absence of a convincing value for military intervention on the periphery, the cost in terms of casualties will always appear to be prohibitive. In such circumstances, the American public is unlikely to suffer U.S. losses for long. The consequent withdrawal of the forces in turn undercuts American credibility abroad, encouraging would-be aggressors. All this eventually undermines public support even in those situations where vital national interests are at stake: the post-Cold War version of the Komer "likelihood fallacy."

At the same time, the Bosnias of the world in various forms are proliferating in the current transition period, and all cannot be ignored. Selective, achievable missions for the military will be necessary occasionally to counter the cumulative credibility loss that can occur if the United States declines consistently to respond to the "gray area challenges" described by Secretary Shultz. That credibility also plays a role in the preservation of national values. Without it, the most likely alternative is an American public suffused with flickering pictures of suffering populations, increasingly reacting to international horrors with the apathy it currently reserves for the daily news reports of the panoply of murder and mayhem on the streets of U.S. cities. In addition, the skills learned and practiced on non-traditional missions by no means constitute a loss in terms of traditional warfighting leadership and training. Finally, selective non-traditional missions at home and abroad can provide a relevancy to the American public for the U.S. military that may be lacking, as it often is, before the ultimate emergence of a clear and present A-level danger.

It is, of course, the possibility of such future peer threats to vital American national interests that must be the primary concern of U.S. military planners even as pressures mount for nontraditional missions. It is in this context that warfighting capabilities for major regional contingencies remain critical as the U.S. military continues to plan for uncertainty in the best tradition of Admiral Horatio Nelson. "But in case signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood," the admiral instructed off Cadiz in October 1805, "no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy."³³ The problem today, is that even the enemy ships are not yet clearly visible, leaving U.S. planners to deal, in the absence of tangible evidence, with what Colin Gray calls the fundamental rule in world politics: "bad times return."³⁴ Historical experience also suggests that by the time a distant threat emerges as a clear and present danger to the United States, it will be too late, as it was in 1941 when the Imperial Japanese Navy had to announce that danger from the air. At the same time, the ongoing unprecedented technological revolution is creating an increasingly more instantaneously dangerous world. In such an environment, capabilities-based planning focused on major regional contingencies can form a credible force foundation for threat-based, requirements planning and implementation when major threats emerge in the future. On the other hand, a premature return in the present to such threat-based, requirements planning, coupled with a preoccupation concerning emerging trends in non-traditional missions for the U.S. military, can lead to a new version of the Ten Year Rule, in which even the existence of Nelson's enemy ships is assumed away for the future as universal U.S. credibility becomes an interest in itself.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

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27. Telford Taylor, *Munich* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979), p. 885.
28. Quote is from the imperialist, E. H. Carson in Bond, p. 18.
29. Irving Kristol, "Defining Our National Interest," *America's Purpose. New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Owen Harries (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991), p. 69. See also Blackwill, pp. 107-108. In November 1994. Secretary of Defense Perry added humanitarian concerns to "vital" and "important" as a separate and lesser degree of intensity. In future humanitarian operations, Perry pointed out, the United States would use "military forces, as opposed to military force, to meet a specific need." Generally, he concluded, "the military is not the right tool to meet humanitarian concerns. . . . We field an Army, not a Salvation Army." Original emphasis. William J. Perry, "The Rule of Engagement," Speech at the Fortune 500 Forum, Philadelphia, PA, 3 November 1994. Perry's three degrees of interest intensity are repeated in the current national security strategy document.

William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: GPO, February 1995), p. 7.

30. Josef Joffe, "Entagled Forever," *America's Purpose*, p. 154.

31. Douglas J. MacDonald, "The Truman Administration and Global Responsibilities: The Birth of the Falling Domino Principle," *Dominoes and Bandwagons*, p. 137.

32. Original emphasis. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. And trans., Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 92.

33. Appendix D, Julian S. Corbett, *The Campaign of Trafalgar* (London: Longmans and Green, 1910), pp. 447-449.

34. Gray, "Villains, Victims, and Sheriffs," p. 354.